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Abstract
Background: In criminal investigations, uncooperative witnesses might deny knowing a perpetrator, the location of
a murder scene or knowledge of a weapon. We sought to identify markers of recognition in eye fixations and
confidence judgments whilst participants told the truth and lied about recognising faces (Experiment 1) and scenes
and objects (Experiment 2) that varied in familiarity. To detect recognition we calculated effect size differences in
markers of recognition between familiar and unfamiliar items that varied in familiarity (personally familiar, newly
learned).
Results: In Experiment 1, recognition of personally familiar faces was reliably detected across multiple fixation
markers (e.g. fewer fixations, fewer interest areas viewed, fewer return fixations) during honest and concealed
recognition. In Experiment 2, recognition of personally familiar non-face items (scenes and objects) was detected
solely by fewer fixations during honest and concealed recognition; differences in other fixation measures were not
consistent. In both experiments, fewer fixations exposed concealed recognition of newly learned faces, scenes and
objects, but the same pattern was not observed during honest recognition. Confidence ratings were higher for
recognition of personally familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces.
Conclusions: Robust memories of personally familiar faces were detected in patterns of fixations and confidence
ratings, irrespective of task demands required to conceal recognition. Crucially, we demonstrate that newly learned
faces should not be used as a proxy for real-world familiarity, and that conclusions should not be generalised across
different types of familiarity or stimulus class.
Keywords: Concealed recognition, Familiarity, Concealed knowledge, Eye fixations, Confidence, Meta-cognition,
Deception
Statement of significance
Detecting recognition of faces, scenes and objects related
to a crime using visual evidence is critical to the investi-
gative process. But witnesses sometimes lie about their
knowledge, whether to conceal involvement in the crime
or due to fear of retribution. In such cases, unobtrusive
methods to index recognition may be useful for unco-
vering concealed knowledge.
Tracking eye movements during inspection of photo-
graphs offers one approach to detect concealed recogni-
tion, but findings to date vary substantially depending
on a complex interplay between stimulus class (e.g. faces
vs non-face items) and degree of familiarity (e.g. person-
ally familiar vs newly learned). We assessed the utility of
eye fixations and confidence judgments to detect
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recognition of faces, scenes and objects that vary in
familiarity.
Markers of recognition for personally familiar faces
were robust irrespective of honesty. Markers of recogni-
tion for newly learned faces differed across honest and
concealed trials and did not exhibit the same consistent
differences observed for personally familiar faces. Our
findings suggest that newly learned faces are processed
similarly to unfamiliar faces and that this limits the
scope for recognition detection. Recognition of person-
ally familiar and newly learned non-face items was solely
differentiated by fewer fixations, but there were no reli-
able differences in the spatial distribution of fixations.
Differences in confidence judgments reliably indicated
recognition for personally familiar faces and honest re-
sponses to personally familiar non-face items. The vary-
ing effects of stimulus class, degree of familiarity and
task instructions on fixation patterns pose a challenge
for recognition detection by eye fixations.
Introduction
Concealed knowledge tests employed in field practice
typically use autonomic measures such as skin conduct-
ance to detect crime details (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003;
Gamer, 2011; Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel,
2008; Meijer, Klein Selle, Elber, & Ben-Shakhar, 2014).
However, less obtrusive methods are desirable for appli-
cation in a wider range of security settings, and remote
eye tracking technology shows distinct promise for field
application. Several recent experiments demonstrated
the efficacy of eye fixation variables for the detection of
concealed knowledge (Lancry-Dayan, Nahari, Ben-Sha-
khar, & Pertzov, 2018; Mahoney, Kapur, Osmon, &
Hannula, 2018; Millen, Hope, Hillstrom, & Vrij, 2017;
Peth, Kim, & Gamer, 2013; Peth, Suchotzki, & Gamer,
2016; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012; Schwedes & Wentura,
2016; for a review see Gamer & Pertzov, 2018). Some re-
search suggests that eye tracking tests can outperform
traditional autonomic measures of concealed knowledge
(e.g. Lancry-Dayan et al., 2018), whereas others present
more cautious conclusions (Peth et al., 2013). Variability
in detection rates across experiments may be partly
explained by the different stimuli depicted across studies
(e.g. faces, scenes or more general objects) and the
strength of familiarity of those people, places and objects
at recognition.
Using fixations to detect recognition
Emergent research suggests that recognition detection of
personally familiar faces is robust, such that fixation pat-
terns for personally familiar faces are easily distinguished
from genuinely unfamiliar faces despite cognitive effort
to conceal recognition during explicit denial (Millen et
al., 2017) and informed strategies to beat the test (herein
referred to as countermeasures; Lancry-Dayan et al.,
2018; Millen & Hancock, 2019, this issue). Millen et al.
(2017, 2019) and Lancry-Dayan et al. (2018) found large
and consistent effect sizes for the detection of personal
familiarity despite using different display formats (se-
quential vs simultaneous respectively) and procedural
methods. Findings for less familiar faces (e.g. one brief
exposure and famous celebrities) are smaller and less ro-
bust (Millen et al., 2017). These findings are in line with
existing research indicating that exposure to variability
in appearance and personal social and emotional experi-
ences (i.e. personal familiarity) facilitates fast, reflexive
recognition (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007; Natu & Toole,
2011; Wiese et al., 2019). Beyond faces, these findings
are consistent with Peth et al. (2013), who reported less
robust findings for incidentally acquired knowledge of
objects during a mock crime; items central to the crime
were successfully detected, but those peripheral to it
were not. To our knowledge, no published research has
systematically explored the robustness of fixation-based
recognition markers of personally familiar photographs
across face and non-face stimuli or compared the rela-
tive ease of detecting personal familiarity over newly
learned items. Newly learned items are commonly used
in tests of concealed knowledge detection.
Predicting patterns of fixations based on
recognition memory
Differences in patterns of fixations during recognition
are well established in the face recognition literature.
Accurate familiar face identification is reported within
two fixations (Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008; for a review see
Hannula et al., 2010), which is consistent with theoret-
ical models of recognition positing that truly familiar
faces are recognised faster and more accurately than
relatively unfamiliar faces (Bruce & Young, 1986; Burton,
Bruce, & Hancock, 1999; Burton, Jenkins, & Schweinber-
ger, 2011; Gobbini et al., 2013; Gobbini & Haxby, 2007;
Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000; Johnston & Edmonds,
2009; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). Fast recog-
nition of a familiar face requires fewer fixations, less dis-
tributed viewing patterns (e.g. across the eyes, nose and
mouth), proportionately less viewing of inner face re-
gions and fewer return fixations to regions of the face
previously viewed, than for unknown faces (e.g. Althoff
& Cohen, 1999). This overall reduction in visual
sampling for familiar faces is also reflected in average
fixation durations, which tend to be longer for familiar
faces (e.g. Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007). Fewer
fixations of longer durations reflect less cognitive effort
during recognition of faces we know—a consequence of
robust memory representations (Balas, Cox, & Conwell,
2007; Natu & Toole, 2011; Ramon & Gobbini, 2017).
Conversely, systematic viewing patterns and shorter
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fixation durations for unfamiliar face identification re-
flect optimal but effortful information extraction for ac-
curate rejection. This reduction in visual exploration for
familiar faces is thought to represent a shift from part-
based to holistic processing (Bobak, Parris, Gregory,
Bennetts, & Bate, 2017; Collishaw & Hole, 2000; Farah,
Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Richler, Mack, Gauthier,
& Palmeri, 2009), which occurs as an unfamiliar face be-
comes familiar via repeated exposures. Nevertheless,
Althoff (1998; see also Althoff et al., 1999) originally
claimed that the effects of recognition on eye fixations
are observable after three exposures to a photograph of
a face. While we know that pixel-to-pixel memory is not
the same as familiar face recognition proper (Burton,
Bruce & Hancock, 1999; Ritchie & Burton, 2017), the
impact of substituting personal familiarity with newly
learned images is unknown in the context of detecting
concealed knowledge by eye tracking.
Fewer fixations are also reported during recognition of
non-face photographs such as buildings (Althoff &
Cohen, 1999) and scenes (e.g. Johnston & Leek, 2009;
Kafkas & Montaldi, 2012; Leek et al., 2012; Ryan et al.,
2007; Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000). However,
where and how people look at non-face photographs
such as complex scenes or general objects is arguably
more variable than it is for faces, partly because these
images are less homogeneous. Here, we evaluate a range
of eye fixation parameters to assess the reliability of
different variables for detecting recognition across
varying degrees of familiarity (personally familiar and
newly learned) and different stimuli classes (faces and
non-face items).
In the eye movement analyses we set out to achieve
three main objectives. (1) To further test the robustness
of differences in patterns of fixations for the detection of
personally familiar faces (e.g. Millen et al., 2017). Here
we explicitly instructed participants to adopt spontan-
eous strategies to beat the test. We motivated deceivers
with a cash incentive if they managed to evade detection.
In Millen et al.’s (2017) original study, only 32%
attempted to conceal recognition using deliberate coun-
termeasure strategies, meaning that the robustness of
their fixation markers may have been overestimated. (2)
To assess whether the markers of recognition for per-
sonally familiar faces in Experiment 1 are the same as
markers of recognition for personally familiar non-face
items such as places and objects in Experiment 2. (3)
Within each experiment, we compared results for per-
sonally familiar items with new images that were learned
to criterion in a study phase (100% face-name pairings)
before lying about the same images at test. Furthermore,
in an entirely novel strand of the research, we examine
whether patterns of verbal confidence judgments differ
for familiar and unfamiliar items and how these patterns
change across stimulus class, familiarity and explicit de-
nial of knowledge.
Predicting patterns of confidence based on
recognition memory
In the legal system, reports of high confidence are
known to impair the ability to detect deception (Tetter-
ton, 2005). Crucially, professionals are no better than lay
persons at distinguishing the veracity of confidence-ac-
curacy relationships (Bond & DePaulo, 2016; Vrij, Fisher,
Mann, & Leal, 2008; DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lind-
say, & Muhlenbruck, 1997). Our rationale for studying
confidence is based on two main theoretical frameworks:
First, models of recognition support that recall of well-
encoded memories is typically fast and accompanied by
high ratings of subjective confidence about those deci-
sions (Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies, 1979; Lefebvre, Marc-
hand, Smith, & Connolly, 2009; Sauerland, Sagana,
Sporer, & Wixted, 2018; Weber & Brewer, 2006; Wells
& Olson, 2003; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Second, eye
movements during decision making reflect deliberations
and decision outcomes (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath,
2012; Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Russo, 2011). Assuming
confidence judgments for familiar items are more stable,
confidence judgments should be higher and less variable
during recognition than genuine deliberations during
correct rejection of genuinely unfamiliar items. The lack
of genuine deliberation during recognition should also
be reflected in reduced fixation patterns (fewer fixations,
fewer areas of scale viewed, fewer return fixations to the
scale) and longer fixation durations during viewing of
the confidence scale. Our specific predictions are that
confidence judgments for genuine responses to learned
or personally known items will be higher and more
homogeneous (less variable) than those to genuinely un-
familiar items. In addition, liars might also exploit the
belief that high confidence reports are convincing by
providing well-rehearsed, consistent and confident mem-




In both experiments, we aimed for a minimum of 24
participants. The planned sample size was based on a
G*Power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) with d = 0.7, an α error probability of .05 and a β
of .95, which estimated 24 participants. The predicted ef-
fect size for the current study is conservative compared
to a similar study by Millen et al. (2017), who reported
large effect sizes for detection of personally familiar faces
by number of fixations (d = 0.9), number of areas of the
face viewed (d = 0.9) and average fixation duration (d =
0.9). Since we did not have a script to directly determine
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exclusions at the point of collecting these data, the total
number of valid participants for analysis exceeded the
minimum required sample size.
General design
In both experiments, participants viewed colour photo-
graphs of familiar and unfamiliar faces (Experiment 1)
or familiar and unfamiliar non-face items (objects and
scenes; Experiment 2). In each experiment participants
first completed one practice block during which they
told the truth about all items, followed by two concealed
recognition blocks. In the concealed blocks, participants
denied recognition of one familiar face type (newly
learned or personally familiar) whilst telling the truth
about all other faces. These three basic task instructions,
deny recognition of one set of familiar ‘probes’; correctly
reject unfamiliar ‘irrelevant’ items; and honestly respond
to a different set of familiar ‘targets’, are similar to the
Concealed Information Test (CIT) three-stimulus proto-
col (e.g. Sauerland, Wolfs, Crans, & Verschuere, 2017;
Seymour & Kerlin, 2008; Verschuere, Crombez,
Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010). Each different type of famil-
iarity (e.g. unfamiliar, newly learned, personally familiar)
was presented in equal trial numbers such that multiple
probes and targets were presented in each block. Partici-
pants made yes/no responses via a button press whilst
verbally stating their response out loud at the same time.
The buttons assigned to yes/no responses were counter-
balanced by hand dominance.
In Experiment 1, participants viewed 40 faces per
block: 10 unfamiliar, 10 newly learned, 10 personally fa-
miliar and 10 famous celebrities. In one concealed block,
participants denied recognition of newly learned ‘probe’
faces, whilst correctly rejecting unfamiliar ‘irrelevant’
faces and honestly identifying personally familiar ‘target’
faces and famous ‘target’ faces. In the other concealed
block, participants denied recognition of personally fa-
miliar ‘probe’ faces, whilst correctly rejecting unfamiliar
‘irrelevant’ faces and honestly identifying newly learned
‘target’ faces and celebrity ‘target’ faces. The 10 celebrity
faces were included to replicate the design of Millen et
al. (2017). In the current experiment we were not inter-
ested in concealed knowledge of famous celebrities; thus,
for the purpose of the current study, these were filler
items and were not analysed further. The set of person-
ally familiar faces for each group of participants (10 par-
ticipant tutees in each group) included the participant’s
own face. In the ‘deny personally familiar faces’ block,
participants were instructed to also deny recognition of
their own face (excluded from analyses). In the ‘deny
recognition of newly learned faces’ block, participants
were instructed to honestly identify their own face (ex-
cluded from analyses) whilst also honestly identifying
the other personally familiar faces.
In Experiment 2, the design was the same except that
participants were not presented with equivalent famous
non-face items. Accordingly, participants viewed 30
non-face items in each block: 10 unfamiliar, 10 newly
learned, 10 personally familiar. In one concealed block,
participants denied recognition of newly learned non-
face probe items, whilst correctly rejecting unfamiliar
non-face ‘irrelevant’ items and honestly identifying per-
sonally familiar non-face items. In the other concealed
block, participants denied recognition of personally fa-
miliar non-face probe items, whilst correctly rejecting
unfamiliar ‘irrelevant’ non-face items and honestly iden-
tifying newly learned ‘target’ non-face items.
Participants
Thirty-three undergraduate students (26 females, 7
males) participated in Experiment 1 (range 19–21 years,
M = 20.3, SD = 1.9), and 38 undergraduate students (36
females, 2 males) participated in Experiment 2 (range
19–27 years, M = 20.31, SD = 1.59). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants
received £5 remuneration for taking part.
Apparatus and materials
Participants’ eye movements were tracked using the Eye-
link II Head Mounted Eye Tracker (SR Research,
Ottawa, ON, Canada) at a recording rate of 250 Hz. Fix-
ations were defined by Eyelink’s online standard parser
configuration as an eye event that was not a blink or sac-
cade. Using the standard cognitive configuration, saccades
were defined as eye movements that exceeded 30°/s vel-
ocity or 8000°/s2 acceleration (SR Research Eyelink II User
Manual, Version 2.14). We additionally set a fixation
threshold of 100ms. The system has a spatial resolution of
less than 0.01° and a spatial accuracy of 0.5°. Manual but-
ton press responses were collected by a Microsoft Side-
winder Plug-and-Play game pad and relayed back to the
host computer.
In Experiment 1, a total of 120 face photographs were
presented over the practice and two concealed recogni-
tion trial blocks (10 unfamiliar identities, 10 newly
learned items, 10 personally known items and 10 famous
faces per block). In Experiment 2, a total of 90 (10 un-
familiar identities, 10 newly learned items, 10 personally
known items) non-face photographs were presented
across the practice and two concealed recognition
blocks. Photographs were presented using Experiment
Builder (Version 1.6.121, SR Research) on a desktop
computer linked to a 19-in. CRT monitor (model
G90FB, resolution 1280 × 1024 pixels, refresh rate 89
Hz). Images were presented randomly to the left (292,
292) or the right side (704, 292) of the screen to minim-
ise anticipatory guessing behaviour of picture location.
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Faces
All photographs were portraits showing the full face of a
person with a neutral expression and eye gaze towards the
camera. The appearance of all photographs was standar-
dised using Adobe Photoshop Elements (Versions 2.0,
CS4) for the removal of red-eye, accessories and jewellery,
and they were extracted from their original background to
a blue background (HEX: #377BE8) measuring (640 × 480
pixels). Unfamiliar faces were sourced with permission
from academic databases (Burton, White, & McNeill,
2010; Psychological Image Collection at Stirling (PICS),
http://pics.stir.ac.uk (Hancock, n.d.); Weyrauch, Heisele,
Huang, & Blanz, 2004) and individuals from schools and
universities (Taunton College, University of Stirling) who
volunteered to have their photographs taken to create an
unfamiliar face database for the purposes of the present
experiment. Newly learned faces were sourced from our
unfamiliar face database and familiarised using a learn-to-
criterion procedure (Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002)
directly before performing the concealed knowledge test.
Personally familiar faces were photographs of the student
participants. Participants were recruited from pre-existing
tutorial groups (established at the start of term by random
allocation to class lists) to ensure a baseline of real-world
familiarity. There were 10 participants in each group. At
the time of the experiment, participants were personally
acquainted with fellow tutees for approximately 5 months.
Multiple images were taken of each person (all with gaze
facing forward) so that a unique image of that person
could be used in each trial block. Personally familiar faces
were matched to newly learned and unfamiliar faces
matched by hair colour, eye colour and skin tone. For
newly learned and unfamiliar faces, new sets of images
were used for each trial block but, within blocks, the same
newly learned image was presented at study and test, since
we specifically wanted to investigate whether using such
familiarisation procedures (e.g. Seymour, Baker, & Gaunt,
2013) produced results equivalent to personal familiarity.
Non-face items (scenes and objects)
Photographs of personally familiar objects and scenes
were specific to psychology student participants at the
university. The photographs comprised colour images of
the city guildhall, entrance to psychology department,
entrance to student union, entrance to university library,
coursework submission point, university logo, log-in to
electronic resources webpage, coursework submission
cover sheet, university hoodie and student ID card. The
first five items represented scenes, whereas the last five
more generally represented objects, all of which were
recognisable to participants. For consistency, the photo-
graphs for irrelevant and newly learned categories
followed the same structure (e.g. photographs of libraries
and sweatshirts from other universities). All images were
taken with a SONY Cyber-shot camera specifically for
the experiment. Photographs were re-sized to 640 × 480
pixels and presented on a blue background (HEX:
#5DBCD2) using Adobe Photoshop CS5.1.
Note: The same personally familiar items (faces, scenes
and objects) were presented in both blocks of trials but
using different photographic images. Newly learned and
unfamiliar items were unique to each block.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a controlled, quiet and dimly
lit room 0.80 m from the display screen. Light levels
were carefully controlled for all participants via a dim-
mer switch. The Eyelink II headband was comfortably
secured to the participant’s head.
Rate personally familiar items
Prior to the test, participants were presented with photo-
graphs of personally familiar items on a paper hand-out.
Participants were asked to look at each photograph in
turn and to indicate, yes or no, if they recognised the
face, scene or object in the photograph. These images
were not the same as the ones presented in the experi-
mental trials. The participant rated each photograph for
familiarity (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = most familiar) and
noted down the name of the face, scene or object. Rat-
ings taken prior to the experiment confirmed personally
known faces (M = 4.90, SD = 0.82) and personally famil-
iar non-face items (M = 6.59, SD = 1.05) as familiar.
Study phase
Prior to the CIT, participants were shown 10 photo-
graphs of faces (Experiment 1) or a selection of scenes
and objects (Experiment 2) and asked to learn them for
the task. Unfamiliar items were presented on 10 individ-
ual colour photograph cards (6 × 8 cm). These were laid
out on the table in front of the participant, who was
asked to study them until he/she perceived them as
learned. A name was then placed below each photo-
graph, and participants were then instructed to learn
which name belonged to each photograph (e.g. ’Jack
Wilson’ or ’Grantham Guildhall’). Once the participant
indicated that he/she had learned the item-name pair-
ings, the cards were shuffled and handed back to the
participant. The participant matched each photograph to
its name tag correctly. The criterion for learning was
that participants pair all photograph-name pairings cor-
rectly 100% twice consecutively (procedure based on
Schyns et al., 2002). There was no time limit for the suc-
cessful completion of the study phase. Upon completion,
measurement of the participant’s eye movements was
calibrated for accurate eye movement monitoring by the
eye tracker.
Millen et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications            (2020) 5:38 Page 5 of 18
Calibration
Eye position was calibrated using a 3 × 3 dot array prior
to each test block and, when necessary, in between con-
dition blocks. To calibrate, a black dot with a white
centre was presented in the middle of the screen. The
participant fixated the white centre of the black dot, and
the experimenter accepted the fixation by pressing a
button on the host computer. Once the initial fixation
was accepted, the same dot was displayed randomly, one
location at a time, using a 3 × 3 array. The host computer
was operated by the experimenter and was positioned be-
hind the participant and the display computer. Following
calibration, participants were informed that eye move-
ments were carefully monitored by the experimenter, from
a separate host computer behind them, with the explicit
purpose of detecting concealed recognition. They were ad-
vised that the experimenter would record eye movement
data such as where they looked on the screen and for how
long, and how often they looked away and looked back.
They were not advised which eye movements might indi-
cate deception. The purpose here was to evaluate if parti-
cipants would or could control their eye movements to
conceal recognition spontaneously. The emphasis on the
monitoring of eye movements aimed to increase processes
of monitoring and control and the employment of coun-
termeasure strategies.
Test phase
See Fig. 1 for an example of a full trial sequence. Par-
ticipants were presented with a fully randomised se-
quence of familiar and unfamiliar colour photographs.
Prior to the display of each face, a fixation dot was
shown in the centre of the screen to correct any drift
in eye movements following the initial calibration.
Participants responded by making a dichotomous ‘fa-
miliar’ or ‘unfamiliar’ button press response whilst at
the same time verbalising their response. Directly
after the button press was made, the photograph was
removed from the screen and a confidence scale was
presented. Participants were instructed to look at the
scale (0–100%) and decide how confident they were
about their previous familiarity judgment. Participants
indicated their confidence judgment by pressing a
trigger button on the game pad (any) whilst
Fig. 1 An example of one full trial sequence. The trial commenced with a drift correction followed by a photograph for recognition (the picture
depicted here is a personally familiar place, the city guildhall), followed by a confidence scale (0–100%). In one block, the participant was
instructed to conceal knowledge of the personally familiar place by pressing a button assigned to the ‘unfamiliar’ response whilst concurrently
saying ‘unfamiliar’ out loud. In the same block, following a similar procedure, participants honestly identified photographs of newly learned items
(pressed and said ‘familiar’) and correctly rejected unfamiliar items (pressed and said ‘unfamiliar’) . In the other block, the participant was
instructed to honestly identify this personally familiar place by pressing a button assigned to the ‘familiar’ response whilst concurrently saying
‘familiar’ out loud. In that block, participants denied recognition of newly learned items and correctly rejected unfamiliar items. Following the
recognition judgment, participants were asked to report how confident they were in their recognition judgment. The instruction for recognition
and confidence judgments was that they should try to appear honest even when they were lying. Photographs for recognition were presented
randomly to the left (292, 292) or the right side (704, 292) of the drift correction dot. Confidence scales were presented randomly at either the
top or the bottom of the screen
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verbalising their rating (numerators of 10, i.e.
’ninety’). There was no upper time limit for recog-
nition or confidence judgments. Both photographs
and confidence scales were presented on-screen
only until the time of response. After the comple-
tion of all trials, participants were administered a
Deception Strategies Questionnaire to record whether
participants tried to evade detection by employing
specific eye movement strategies or manipulations of
confidence.
Deception strategies questionnaire
A short questionnaire was designed to gauge whether
participants attempted to adopt any behavioural strat-
egies during the task. Participants were asked the follow-
ing questions: Did you adopt any strategies during the
task? (Participants circled a yes or no answer.); What
strategies did you adopt when lying? What strategies did
you adopt when telling the truth? What behaviours do
you think are indicative of lying? What behaviours do
you think are indicative of telling the truth? (Participants
provided free text responses.) We also asked if partici-
pants thought they were successful in their attempt to
conceal knowledge (circle yes or no and state why) and
what photographs were hardest to lie about (newly
learned or personally familiar). A final question asked
participants whether they thought they displayed more
of 12 listed behaviours depending on whether they were
lying or telling the truth (cf. no difference), e.g. looked at
the photograph more, looked away from the photograph,
looked more at the confidence scale. No specific hypo-
theses were generated in relation to possible eye move-
ment strategies.
Data analysis
Definition of interest areas
Figure 2 illustrates the defining of interest areas for one
face (Experiment 1), one scene (Experiment 2) and the
confidence screen (Experiments 1 and 2).
Experiment 1: faces
Consistent with previous research (e.g. Bate, Haslam,
Tree, & Hodgson, 2008; Walker-Smith, Gale, & Findlay,
1977), five areas of interest were defined: right eye (left
side of visual space), left eye (right side of visual space),
nose, mouth and ‘outer’. The eyes, nose and mouth were
grouped for analysis of the proportion of fixations made
to the inner region of the face. The remainder of the
image was classified as ‘outer’.
Experiment 2: non-face items
Using a method consistent with previous research on
visual processing of scenes and objects (e.g. Smith &
Squire, 2008), a fixed 4 × 4 grid was applied to each
photograph to create 16 equally sized interest areas. The
central four sections of the grid (top left, top right, bot-
tom left, bottom right) formed the inner four inner re-
gions of the photograph. The 12 remaining sections that
surrounded the inner regions were grouped and merged
to create one outer region. Each image therefore pre-
sented five interest areas for analyses, consistent with
the number and structure of interest areas created for
faces in Experiment 1.
Experiments 1 and 2: verbal confidence
Judgment options ranged from 0 to 100% in multiples of
10, such that each participant selected one out of 11
possible confidence judgments for each trial (0%, 10%,
Fig. 2 Interest areas defined: face (Experiment 1), non-face item (Experiment 2), confidence screen (Experiments1, 2) Photograph of actual person
not shown as permissions not available
Millen et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications            (2020) 5:38 Page 7 of 18
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100%). The
mean and spread of values was analysed by entering SDs as
the unit of analysis in repeated measures analyses of variance
(RM ANOVAs) (see also Leongómez et al., 2014).
Experiments 1 and 2: confidence screens
To analyse the sampling distribution of eye movements
during confidence judgments, boxes were drawn around
each confidence decision box to create 11 interest areas:
0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%,
100%. This allowed calculation of the number of interest
areas (IAs) fixated and return fixations to the same re-
gions of interest (Return Fixations) during deliberation
of each confidence rating.
Markers of recognition: theoretical justification
Consistent with previous research (Althoff & Cohen,
1999; Bate et al., 2008; Walker-Smith et al., 1977), we se-
lected five markers of recognition based on their theor-
etical significance. The number of fixations made to the
item was recorded as a general marker of cognitive effort
for recognition (Num. Fixations). The number of differ-
ent interest areas of the image viewed (IAs Visited) re-
flect the amount of information required to make a
response. The number of return fixations to previously
viewed areas of interest (two consecutive fixations in the
same interest area belong to the same run and do not
define a return) reflect the degree of uncertainty, or need
to resolve ambiguity, in the decision-making process
(Return Fixations; e.g. Barton, Radcliffe, Cherkasova,
Edelman, & Intriligator, 2006). The proportion of fixa-
tions made to the inner regions of the image (Propor-
tion Inner) reflects the extent to which recognition is
achieved from inspecting critical features. Finally,
average fixation duration (Ave Fix Duration) was re-
corded as an index of depth of processing. Average
fixation durations are known to be modulated by rec-
ognition-orienting effects as well as cognitive load
during lies (e.g. response conflict and strategies to
conceal knowledge; Cook et al., 2012). Ave Fix Dur-
ation was calculated by summing the length of all fix-
ations made to the item and then dividing by the
number of total fixations. In sum, we predicted that
recognition of familiar items would require less cogni-
tive effort and that this would be reflected in fewer
fixations, fewer IAs visited, fewer return fixations,
fewer proportion of fixations directed to the inner re-
gions of the image (faces, scenes and objects only)
and longer fixation durations. Confidence judgments
(0–100%) were recorded after each recognition re-
sponse to assess the potential of patterns of confi-
dence judgments as a novel marker of recognition.
Cohen’s d effect size analyses
The detection of concealed knowledge is primarily con-
cerned with identifying robust markers of recognition
via large effect sizes with narrow confidence intervals.
Accordingly, we present our data across both experi-
ments as Cohen’s d effect size differences with 95%
confidence intervals (CIs). Here, Cohen’s d is calculated
based on standardised difference scores for each
dependent variable (e.g. Ben-Shakhar, 1985).
For each participant, half of the valid irrelevant items
(after exclusions) were removed from each block to
allow simulation of a virtual ‘innocent’ group of un-
knowledgeable responses for the receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) analyses outlined below. The mean and
SD of the remaining irrelevant responses were then used
to compute z-scores separately for (1) the simulated ‘un-
knowledgeable’ innocent group and (2) the probe items
for the knowledgeable group, compared to the same
remaining irrelevants. The number of probe items used
for the resampling was defined by valid irrelevants/2.
Where the number of valid probe trials was less than ir-
relevants/2, the participant was dropped from analyses.
The resampling process was repeated 1000 times to
compute mean values for Cohen’s d and the ROC area
under the curve (AUC), with 95% CIs. For participants
who had the same score for every irrelevant item, result-
ing in a standard deviation of zero, z-scores were com-
puted using the SD of the whole set of responses for
that participant. Note that this is conservative since, if
the response to probe items does differ from that of the
irrelevant items, the SD of the whole set of responses
will always be bigger than the SD of the irrelevant items
alone, resulting in lower z-scores.
Receiver operating characteristic curves
For applied purposes, it is important to determine the
efficacy of our fixation markers for distinguishing con-
cealed recognition from correct rejection of genuinely
unknown items. ROC curves plot the true positive rate
(i.e. sensitivity) against the false positive rate and calcu-
late an AUC. AUC values range from 0 to 1, with 0.5
indicating chance detection (see also Ben-Shakhar, Lie-
blich, & Kugelmass, 1970). To perform ROC classifica-
tions, average z-scores were calculated separately for the
simulated unknowledgeable innocent group and probe
items for the knowledgeable group, for each participant.
MATLAB® was used to calculate Cohen’s d and AUCs
with 95% bootstrapped CIs.
Results
Results are presented here for the two main experimen-
tal blocks. Data from the practice block are reported in
Supplementary Material Figure S1 (Experiment 1) and
Figure S2 (Experiment 2).
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Experiment 1 exclusions. We analysed 27 out of 33
participants following exclusion of four participants due
to technical errors, and two participants who failed to
complete the task according to instructions. After exclu-
sion of famous celebrity trials, we extracted data for 60
trials for each of the 27 participants (20 responses to
personally familiar faces, 20 responses to newly learned
faces and 20 responses to unfamiliar faces). Out of a
total of 1620 trials, we removed 54 responses to partici-
pants’ own faces (one per participant per block), 43
errors according to task instructions and 15 trials for
responses faster than 300ms or slower than 5000 ms
(eg. Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji 2003). The total number
of trials analysed for the full trial period was 1508 out of
a possible 1620. For analyses of the first 750 ms, we
further removed 49 trials faster than 750 ms. For one
participant this left too few trials for resampling.
Removal of the participant resulted in loss of a further
10 trials. In total, 1449 out of 1508 were analysed for the
first 750 ms.
Experiment 2 exclusions. Two participants were ex-
cluded from Experiment 2 due to technical issues, leaving
35 out of 37 participants for analyses. The 35 participants
completed 60 trials each, totalling 2100 trials. Seventy-two
trials were removed for errors according to task instruc-
tions as well as 31 trials that were faster than 300ms or
slower than 5000ms. For the full trial period we analysed
1997 out of 2100 trials. For analysis of the first 750ms, a
further 39 trials faster than 750ms were removed. This re-
sulted in too few trials for resampling for one participant.
The participant was excluded from analysis, resulting in
the loss of 13 more trials. In total, 1945 out of 1997 trials
were included in analysis of the first 750ms.
Trial errors are defined as incorrect ‘familiar’ responses
to unfamiliar items; ‘unfamiliar’ responses to familiar
items during honest identification; and ‘familiar’ responses
to familiar items during concealed recognition.
Markers of recognition
Figures 3 and 4 show Cohen’s d effect sizes (Mfamiliar
– Munfamiliar) for faces in Experiment 1 and non-face
items in Experiment 2. In each figure we show
Cohen’s d for (a) honest identification and (b) con-
cealed recognition trials. For calculation of Cohen’s d,
familiar items were compared to unfamiliar items
from the same block. Data shown for the Full trial
Fig. 3 Cohen’s d effect size differences (95% CIs) for faces in Experiment 1a honest identification of familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces, b
concealed recognition of familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces. On the left, data shown for the Full trial period are Response Times, Num.
Fixations, IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion Inner, Ave Fix Duration, Mean Confidence. On the right, we show re-analysis of the five fixation
markers for the First 750 ms of the trial: Num. Fixations, IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion Inner, Ave Fix Duration. Cohen’s d effect sizes are
shown for comparisons between personally familiar faces and unfamiliar faces (black bars) and newly learned faces compared to unfamiliar faces
(white bars). Tests of equality for effect sizes between honest and concealed conditions are presented in Supplementary Material Table S1
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period are Response Time, Num. Fixations, IAs Vis-
ited, Return Fixations, Proportion Inner, Ave. Fixation
Duration, Mean Confidence judgments. Response
times are included to show the relationship between
fixation measures and response times. Negative values
on the y axis (Cohen’s d) are consistent with faster
response times, fewer fixations, fewer interest areas
visited, fewer return fixations and a lower proportion
of fixations to inner regions during recognition. Posi-
tive values on the y axis reflect longer fixation dura-
tions and higher mean confidence ratings during
recognition. The vertical dashed line indicates the
point in the figure at which data consistent with pre-
dictions should change from negative to positive
values. Data presented for the First 750 ms are Num.
Fixations, IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion
Inner, Ave Fix Duration. An exploratory analysis of
the first 750 ms was conducted to investigate if
markers of recognition were identifiable in less than a
second. Establishing early markers of recognition may
be useful if someone attempts to conceal recognition
by responding quickly to all items. We selected the
first 750 ms based on the emergence of early markers
of recognition in previous research (Althoff & Cohen,
1999; Millen & Hancock, 2019; Ryan et al., 2007) and
to minimise trial loss.
Results from Experiment 1 (faces) are shown in Fig. 3.
Recognition of personally familiar faces (black bars)
was clearly differentiated from correct rejection of un-
familiar faces in multiple fixation measures and confi-
dence ratings, across honest (a) and concealed
recognition trials (b), with markers of recognition ob-
served in the first 750 ms. Recognition of newly
learned faces (white bars) was not consistently distin-
guished from unfamiliar faces across honest and con-
cealed recognition trials.
Results from Experiment 2 (non-face items) are shown
in Fig. 4. Recognition of personally familiar non-face
items (black bars) was identified by faster response times
and fewer fixations during both honest (a) and concealed
recognition trials (b). Fewer fixations were also ob-
served in the first 750 ms of the trial. Recognition of
newly learned non-face items (white bars) was not
reliably detected across honest and concealed recogni-
tion trials. Detailed summaries are reported in the
following sections.
Fig. 4 Cohen’s d effect size differences (95% CIs) for non-face items in Experiment 2a honest identification of familiar non-face items compared
to unfamiliar non-face items, b concealed recognition of familiar non-face items compared to unfamiliar non-face items. On the left, data shown
for the Full trial period are Response Times, Num. Fixations, IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion Inner, Ave Fix Duration, Mean Confidence. On
the right, we show re-analysis of the five fixation markers for the First 750 ms of the trial: Num. Fixations, IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion
Inner, Ave Fix Duration. Cohen’s d effect sizes are shown for comparisons between personally familiar non-face items and unfamiliar non-face
items (black bars) and newly learned non-face items compared to unfamiliar non-face items (white bars). Tests of equality for effect sizes between
honest and concealed conditions are presented in Supplementary Material Table S2
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Experiment 1 (faces)
Figure 3 shows that recognition of personally familiar faces
(black bars) was faster than correct rejection of unfamiliar
faces during both honest (a) and concealed recognition (b).
Consistent with predictions, fast recognition of personally
familiar faces was differentiated by fewer fixations, fewer
interest areas visited, fewer return fixations and a lower pro-
portion of fixations to the inner regions of the face. The
same pattern of fixation results was observed during honest
identification (a) and concealed recognition trials (b) and
during the full trial period and the first 750ms of the trial.
Longer fixation durations additionally indicated recognition
in the full trial period of concealed recognition trials, but
confidence intervals displayed substantial variability. Higher
mean verbal confidence ratings were reported during recog-
nition of personally familiar faces, compared to unfamiliar
faces, in both honest and concealed recognition trials.
Higher mean verbal confidence ratings during concealed
recognition were also associated with more homogeneous
(less variable) confidence ratings, Cohen’s d =−.52 [−.92,
−.11]. Tests for equality of effect sizes between honest and
concealed conditions revealed that the proportion of fixa-
tions to inner face regions in concealed trials was smaller,
but still significant, than for honest trials. There were no
other effect size differences between conditions (see Supple-
mentary Material Table S1).
Figure 3a shows that, opposite to predictions, honest
recognition of newly learned faces (white bars) was
slower and required more fixations than correct rejec-
tion of unfamiliar faces. Conversely, Fig. 3b shows that
concealed recognition of newly learned faces was faster
and required fewer fixations than unfamiliar faces, which
was consistent with our predictions. Accordingly, com-
parison of Cohen’s d across honest and concealed condi-
tions confirmed differences in the pattern of data
between honest and concealed recognition trials. There
were no other significant differences in fixation mea-
sures (IAs Visited, Return Fixations, Proportion Inner,
Average Fixation Duration) or verbal confidence ratings
(mean ratings of variability)
Summary of experiment 2 (non-face items)
Figure 4 shows that, consistent with predictions, recogni-
tion of personally familiar non-face items (black bars) was
faster than for correct rejection of unfamiliar faces. During
honest identifications (a), faster recognition was differenti-
ated by fewer fixations and higher mean verbal confidence
ratings, which was consistent with our predictions. Mean
verbal confidence ratings were also more homogeneous
during honest recognition of personally familiar non-face
items compared to correct rejection of unfamiliar non-
face items, d = −.65 [− 1.0, −.28]. Contrary to predictions,
and results in Experiment 1, a larger proportion of time
was spent viewing the inner regions on personally familiar
non-face items, compared to unfamiliar non-face items.
There were also no differences detected in the number of
interest areas visited, return fixations or average fixation
durations during the full trial period (see Supplementary
Material Table S2). However, in the first 750ms, whilst
participants made fewer fixations to personally familiar
compared to unfamiliar non-face items, these fixations
were more widely distributed (more interested areas
viewed, more return fixations), which was the opposite
pattern to that predicted and different to the data for the
full trial period. The data suggest that during honest iden-
tification of personally familiar non-face items, fixations
are more distributed in the first 750ms but not for the full
trial period, where the majority of time overall is spent
viewing the inner regions of the item.
During concealed recognition of personally familiar
non-face items (b), faster recognition was differentiated
by fewer fixations, fewer interest areas visited and fewer
return fixations, compared to unfamiliar faces. As in Fig.
4a, a larger proportion of fixations was directed to the
inner regions of personally familiar non-face items com-
pared to unfamiliar ones. There were no differences in
average fixation durations or mean verbal confidence
ratings. Across honest and concealed recognition trials,
there was no difference in response times, the number
of fixations made or the proportion of fixations to inner
regions. However, the average fixation duration, the
number of interest areas visited, the number of return
fixations and mean verbal confidence ratings were differ-
ent between honest and concealed recognition trials.
Recognition of newly learned non-face items was not re-
liably detected across honest and concealed conditions.
However, fewer fixations did distinguish concealed
recognition of newly learned items for unfamiliar
non-face items in the full trial analysis, but not in the
first 750 ms. Reported mean confidence ratings were
unexpectedly lower during concealed recognition of
newly learned items compared to unfamiliar non-face
items.
In sum, detection of recognition was robust for per-
sonally familiar faces across multiple markers of recogni-
tion (e.g. fewer fixations, fewer interest areas viewed,
fewer return fixations), but not for newly learned faces.
Fewer fixations was the most reliable marker of recogni-
tion across experiments. Recognition was detected by
fewer fixations during honest and concealed recognition
of personally familiar faces, during concealed recognition
of newly learned faces (but not honest identifications),
during honest and concealed recognition of personally
familiar non-face items and during concealed recogni-
tion of newly learned non-face items (bot not honest
identifications). Fewer fixations observed during recogni-
tion of personally familiar faces (Experiment 1) and non-
face items (Experiment 2) were also observed in the first
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750 ms. Verbal confidence ratings clearly distinguished
honest identification of personally familiar faces and
non-face items from unfamiliar ones, but the equivalent
contrasts for concealed recognition trials were variable.
Confidence was not a reliable indicator of recognition
for newly learned faces or non-face items. There were
no consistent differences in eye fixation variables during
viewing of the verbal confidence screen. See Discussion
for further comment.
Deception strategies (questionnaire data)
In Experiment 1 (faces), 3 out of 27 participants re-
ported trying to look more at the face during lie trials, 6
reported trying to look less and 18 simply reported trying
to do the same.
In Experiment 2 (non-face items), 10 out of 35 partici-
pants reported trying to look less during concealed rec-
ognition, 7 reported trying to fixate only on the centre
of the image, 15 reported simply trying to do the same
and 3 reported no strategies at all. In sum, all partici-
pants reported strategies, but most of these were am-
biguous and showed no insight into how to conceal
knowledge in fixation patterns. No further analyses were
performed on these data. The data suggest that variabil-
ity in patterns of fixations across different conditions is a
consequence of general task demands and strength of
recognition rather than explicit fixation strategies.
Receiver operating characteristic curves
Tables 1 and 2 show that calculated AUCs were consist-
ent with meaningful effect sizes in the main results sec-
tion (markers of recognition until response). Concealed
recognition of personally familiar faces was consistently
detected above chance across all variables. Concealed
recognition was detected by fewer fixations for all stim-
uli classes (faces and non-face items) and all levels of fa-
miliarity (newly learned and personally familiar items).
Fewer fixations were observed in the first 750 ms for
personally familiar face and non-face items, but less reli-
ably for newly learned items.
Discussion
Our aim was to identify reliable markers of recognition
in fixations and confidence judgments. We tested the ro-
bustness of multiple fixation measures for the detection
of concealed recognition across different classes of
photographic stimuli (faces and non-faces) and different
types of familiarity (personally familiar and newly
learned). For Experiment 1, we predicted that recogni-
tion of personally familiar faces would be observed ro-
bustly across multiple markers of recognition, compared
to newly learned faces. In Experiment 2, we also pre-
dicted that recognition of personally familiar items
would be more reliably detected, compared to newly
learned familiarity. We further predicted that confidence
judgments would be higher and more stable for all fa-
miliar items (faces and non-faces) compared to correct
rejection of genuine unfamiliar items. Our key finding,
that detection of recognition of personally familiar faces
was robust whereas other conditions were substantially
more variable, is discussed in detail below.
As predicted, recognition of personally familiar faces
was reliably detected across multiple markers of recogni-
tion irrespective of honesty. Specifically, recognition of
personally familiar faces was marked by faster response
times, fewer fixations, fewer areas of the face viewed,
fewer return fixations to previously viewed areas of the
face, a smaller proportion of fixations to inner face
regions and longer fixation durations, compared to
unfamiliar faces. Robust differences observed in fixation
patterns between familiar and unfamiliar faces across
measures confirm that processing of well-known faces is
distinct from that for unfamiliar faces (see Johnston &
Edmonds, 2009 for a review), and that these differences
in fixations can be used to detect concealed recognition
of well-known faces (Lancry-Dayan et al., 2018; Millen
et al., 2017; Millen & Hancock, 2019). The finding that
the same pattern of results was observed during both
honest and concealed recognition of personally familiar
faces confirms the robustness of our recognition markers
for detection of concealed recognition of personally
Table 1 Areas under the curve [95% CIs] calculated for all markers of recognition in Experiment 1 for the full trial period and first
750 ms of the trial. Numbers in bold indicate AUCs above chance (i.e. the lower bound limit CI exceeds .50)
Experiment 1
Measure
Full trial First 750 ms
Newly learned Personally familiar Newly learned Personally familiar
Response Times .66 [.57, .75] .80 [.73, .87] NA NA
Num. Fix .67 [.59, .75] .83 [.76, .89] .57 [.50, .65] .64 [.57, .72]
IAs Visited .49 [.04, .57] .76 [.69, .84] .50 [.42, .57] .61 [.53, .68]
Return Fixation .57 [.48, .64] .79 [.71, .86] .50 [.42, .58] .62 [.54, .70]
Prop. Inner .49 [.41, .57] .68 [.60, .77] .55 [.47, .62] .65 [.57, .72]
Ave Fix Duration .56 [.47, .65] .59 [.51, .67] .54 [.45, .63] .57 [.49, .67]
Confidence .44 [.36, .52] .58 [.51, .65] NA NA
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familiar faces (e.g. Millen et al., 2017; Millen & Hancock,
2019). The emergence of early markers of familiar face
recognition in the first 750 ms is consistent with previ-
ous research (e.g. Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al.,
2007) and signifies the potential for recognition detec-
tion if deceivers attempted to respond quickly to all
faces. The exception that longer fixation durations
indexed recognition exclusively during concealment (e.g.
Millen & Hancock, 2019), but not honest identification,
highlights the key role of response conflict in eliciting
differences in fixation durations (e.g. Cook et al., 2012).
Differences in mean verbal confidence judgments, which
were higher and less variable for personally familiar faces
compared to correct rejection of genuinely unfamiliar
faces, provided converging evidence that personally
familiar memories were represented differently in mem-
ory. In sum, liars were unable to conceal recognition of
personally familiar faces. As such, eye tracking shows
clear potential for uncovering networks of criminals
who are associated or personally known to each other in
real life.
By contrast, markers of recognition for newly learned
faces were not consistent across honest and concealed
recognition trials. Although faster responses and fewer
fixations indexed concealed recognition of newly learned
faces as predicted, slower response times and an increase
in fixations were unexpectedly observed during honest
identification of newly learned faces. Although slower re-
sponse times (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Peth, Crombez &
Gamer, 2015) and more fixations (Seymour, Baker, &
Gaunt, 2005) are reported in reaction time-based CITs
during denial of recognition, this pattern of responding
is not typically observed during honest identifications. In
fact, slower response times and increased fixations are
classically only reported in the concealed knowledge lit-
erature when using a presentation ratio of one familiar
item to many unfamiliar items and a concealment in-
struction, which is fundamental to eliciting response
conflict that drives the slower responding. When partici-
pants were instructed to respond honestly to items
presented using a 1:1 ratio, faster responses (Suchotzki
et al., 2015) and fewer fixations (Seymour et al., 2005)
were reported. This change in pattern of responding rep-
resents a shift in the theoretical premise of the test to
one that is consistent with theoretical models of recogni-
tion, wherein familiar items are recalled from memory
faster.
Because we did not present few familiar items among
many unfamiliar items, we did not predict slower
responding or an increase in fixations for either honest
or concealed recognition trials. Our experiment was
designed to tap into effects corresponding to different
types of familiarity, and so we presented many familiar
faces (75%) among few unfamiliar faces. Participants lied
about one group of familiar faces per block, whilst telling
the truth about all other faces, which means approxi-
mately half of all responses in each test block were
‘familiar’ judgments. Considering the presentation ratio
of our stimuli and the memory load of the task, we
expected that participants would have to carefully
inspect each face before executing the appropriate
response selection, and that items stored in memory
would be recalled faster. Accordingly, we expected our
pattern of data to replicate honest responding observed
in standard recognition paradigms (e.g. Althoff & Cohen,
1999) as opposed to slower responding in reaction-time-
based CITs (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele,
Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017).
Consequently, we consider that the most probable ex-
planation for the delay in responding to newly learned
faces was that participants found it more effortful to re-
call these newly learned faces whilst they were incenti-
vised to focus on the concealment of personally familiar
faces (see Krebs, Boehler, & Woldroff, 2010 on the influ-
ence of reward on conflict processing). If participants
prioritised the concealment of personally familiar faces,
then it is feasible that the process of recollection and re-
sponse planning for the newly learned faces might be de-
layed under competing processing demands (Seymour,
2001; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014). We know
Table 2 Areas under the curve [95% CIs] calculated for all markers of recognition in Experiment 2 for the full trial period and first
750 ms of the trial. Numbers in bold indicate AUCs above chance (i.e. the lower bound limit CI exceeds .50)
Experiment 2
Measure
Full trial First 750 ms
Newly learned Personally familiar Newly learned Personally familiar
Response Times .69 [.62, .74] .81 [.75, .86] NA NA
Num. Fix .77 [.72, .82] .87 [.83, .91] .55 [.48, .62] .62 [.55, .68]
IAs Visited .68 [.62, .74] .55 [.50, .61] .52 [.45, .61] .46 [.39, .53]
Return Fixation .71 [.65, .77] .60 [.55, .66] .53 [.45, .60] .45 [.38, .51]
Prop. Inner .47 [.42, .53] .28 [.22, .34] .43 [.35, .50] .44 [.37, .51]
Ave Fix Duration .60 [.55, .65] .66 [.61, .71] .42 [.35, .49] .34 [.27, .41]
Confidence .44 [.38, .50] .43 [.36, .50] NA NA
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that newly familiar faces are distinctly effortful to recall
and thus are more likely to be subject to changes in task
demands when memory load is high (Hancock et al.,
2000). The finding that reverse effects were observed
during recognition of newly learned faces, but not
during recognition of personally familiar faces in Experi-
ment 1 (or newly learned or personally familiar non-face
items in Experiment 2), highlights the unreliability of fix-
ation markers for detecting recognition of newly learned
faces. Our findings are consistent with eye movement re-
search underlining the crucial role of cognitive factors
such as degree of familiarity, explicit task instructions and
stimulus presentation on attention during visual process-
ing tasks (e.g. Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Nahari, Lancry-
Dayan, Ben-Shakhar, & Pertzov, 2019; Yarbus, 1967).
Markers of recognition for personally familiar non-face
items in Experiment 2 were not as robust as those
observed for faces in Experiment 1 (i.e. fewer markers of
recognition were identified across honest and concealed
trials). For example, during concealed recognition we
observed multiple markers of recognition including fas-
ter response times, fewer fixations, fewer interest areas
viewed, fewer return fixations to familiar compared to
unfamiliar non-face items. The effects for response times
and number of fixations were robust across honest and
concealed recognition, but differences in the number of
interest areas viewed and return fixations disappeared
during honest identification of personally familiar non-
face items. Fewer fixations indicated recognition in the
full trial period and the first 750 ms of the trial. Con-
versely, none of the markers of recognition for newly
learned non-face items were reliable across honest and
concealed recognition trials. Fewer fixations and longer
fixation durations indicated concealed recognition of
newly learned faces, but not during honest recognition.
Fewer fixations during concealed recognition were
observed in the full trial period and the first 750 ms, but
longer fixation durations were only present in the full
trial period. Interestingly, fewer fixations indicated con-
cealed knowledge of newly learned non-face items, but
response times did not. It is possible that, in some con-
ditions, number of fixations may be a more sensitive
marker of recognition due to its higher temporal reso-
lution. Reports of lower mean confidence ratings for fa-
miliar non-face items, compared to unfamiliar items,
underline the lack of certainty for newly learned items in
this condition. It is also interesting to note that partici-
pants spent most of their time viewing the inner region
of familiar non-face items compared to unfamiliar ones.
This finding was not what we expected, but it is
partly consistent with previous research which reports
a central viewing tendency for viewing of scenes in
laboratory-based experiments, such that the focus of
attention is allocated to the centre of the scene
(Bindemann, Scheepers, Ferguson, & Burton, 2010;
Tatler, 2007). Some researchers suggest that the centre of
a scene provides an ideal location for efficiently extracting
information as a whole (Renninger, Vergheese, & Cough-
lan, 2007).
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 further confirm
that markers of recognition for personally familiar items
are more reliable than for newly learned items. These
findings are consistent with previous research by Peth et
al. (2013), who found that recognition of crime details
central to a mock crime was detected above chance, but
details peripheral to the crime were not. We also ob-
served that markers of recognition were fewer for per-
sonal familiar non-face items than for personally familiar
faces, suggesting that personally familiar faces were more
richly represented in memory. This is surprising, given
that familiarity ratings (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = very fa-
miliar) for personally familiar non-face items in Experi-
ment 2 were almost at ceiling (M = 6.59, SD = 1.05)
compared to lower ratings for personally familiar faces
in Experiment 1 (M = 4.90, SD = 0.82).
In short, liars were unable to conceal recognition of
personally familiar faces, places and objects. Our find-
ings support that recognition involving real-world per-
sonal familiarity is superior to newly learned familiarity
based on a single image. In particular, multiple markers
of recognition observed for personally familiar faces con-
firm that well-established familiarity is fast and relatively
holistic, making detection by eye fixations straightfor-
ward. The current findings build on a few existing stud-
ies that emphasise the importance of encoding strength
on fixations as markers of recognition (Millen et al.,
2017; Millen & Hancock, 2019; Peth et al., 2013). Other
variants of the CIT have also demonstrated that encoding
strength interacts with detection by physiological mea-
sures (e.g. Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar,
2003), response times (e.g. Georgiadou, Chronos,
Verschuere, & Sauerland, 2019; Seymour & Fraynt, 2009)
and event-related brain potentials (e.g. Meijer, Smulders,
Merckelbach, & Wolf, 2007). The current study extends
this research to show that newly learned faces or non-face
items do not approximate personal familiarity. We
propose that, when establishing the robustness of markers
of recognition to detect intentional concealment, a clear
distinction should be drawn between different types of
familiarity (i.e. brief incidental exposure, newly learned
faces, well-established personal familiarity), and that con-
clusions made when using one kind of familiarity should
not be assumed to generalise to all types of familiar faces.
This point is particularly pertinent for faces. Crucially, we
demonstrate that suspects most likely to strongly deny
their association (i.e. criminal gang members who know
each other well) are the ones for whom it should be easiest
to detect.
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The current findings present a promising avenue for
the use of eye fixations and memory confidence for con-
cealed knowledge detection. However, we note three key
points that warrant further investigation in future re-
search. First, our exploration of verbal confidence ratings
and fixation patterns during lies about recognition confi-
dence showed that mean confidence ratings were higher
and less variable for personally familiar faces (Experi-
ment 1), but that there were no differences in the way
that individuals looked at the confidence scale during
recognition compared to deliberation of genuinely un-
familiar faces and non-face items. This exploration was a
first step in evaluating a new approach to detecting lies
about recognition drawing on reported meta-cognitive
markers. However, some methodological issues may
have limited the utility of our results. In the current ex-
periment we chose to select an 11-point, 0–100% scale
(cf. Sauer, Brewer, & Weber, 2008). However, we found
that mean verbal confidence ratings were generally high,
which may have contributed to ceiling effects and homo-
geneity of the confidence data. In addition, we observed
that participants tended to look very little at the confi-
dence screen during confidence decisions, thus generat-
ing no meaningful differences in fixation behaviour. Use
of a scale that required more cognitive engagement, such
as the movement of a slide on a continuous 0–100 scale
or the use of verbally meaningful anchors on the scale,
might have detected finer grained differences in confi-
dence whilst also encouraging attention to the screen.
Debates regarding the best way to accurately assess
the relationship between memory confidence and accur-
acy are complex, and the efficacy of numeric scales (ver-
bal labels, for instance) for establishing a relationship
between confidence and accuracy has been questioned
(e.g. Weber, Brewer, & Margitich, 2008; Windschitl &
Wells, 1996). Psychological research tends to support
that individuals think about confidence in verbal terms.
Accordingly, the American judicial systems suggest the
use of verbal scales with witnesses. However, research
findings on this topic are mixed. For example, Wind-
schitl and Wells (1996) found that verbal measures of
confidence were more sensitive to factors relating to
uncertainty, whereas Weber et al. (2008) compared
numeric confidence responses on an 11-point scale to
verbal labels and found very little difference in the
confidence-accuracy relationship. Identifying patterns of
deceptive confidence reporting is important for the legal
system, since confidence has such a strong impact on
witness credibility. We suggest that future research
should find ways to more actively engage deceptive
individuals in measurable meta-cognitive processes
during lies about confidence.
Second, in the current experiments, interest areas were
manually drawn on our photographs. This method was
selected because we wanted to establish simple markers of
recognition that tapped into differences in fixation
quantity and distribution that could be easily applied
across different types of photographic stimuli. However, in
the future we will explore more sophisticated methods for
analysis that rely on participant-dependent hotspots, simi-
lar to the analysis of functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) data (e.g. Cornelissen, Hancock, Kiviniemi,
George, & Tovée, 2009; Lao, Miellet, Pernet, Sokhn, &
Caldara, 2017). Saliency maps (Borji, Parks, & Itti, 2014;
Borji & Itti, 2013) and meaning maps (Henderson &
Hayes, 2018; Henderson, Hayes, Rehrig, & Ferreirs, 2018)
will be useful to identify relevant parts of the image for
more fine-grained analyses that address debates on what
defines saliency (e.g. Hayes & Henderson, 2019).
Third, evaluation of concealment strategies in the
current experiment revealed that most participants re-
ported ‘trying to do the same’ during concealed trials,
which had no apparent effect on detection of personally
familiar face recognition. Accordingly, we can conclude
that fixation markers for personal familiarity are robust
in the context of ambiguous strategies, which is consist-
ent with other concealed knowledge research using
different methodologies (e.g. Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003;
Meijer et al., 2014). However, few studies have assessed
the robustness of fixation measures during informed
countermeasures to conceal recognition (Millen & Han-
cock, 2019; Peth et al., 2016; Nahari et al., 2019, this
issue). Whereas Millen & Hancock (2019, this issue)
found that fixation durations were largely robust to
intentional eye movement strategies to look at every face
the same way, Nahari et al. (2019) found that fixation
duration as a marker of recognition in simultaneous
displays of faces (one familiar face to many unfamiliar
faces) vanished when participants were instructed to
look at all faces equally. Alternatively, Peth and col-
leagues examined the effectiveness of physical and men-
tal countermeasures (physical finger wiggling or mental
imagining of emotional events) during recognition of
incidentally encoded information, and found that fewer
fixations were invulnerable to both countermeasures but
that fixation durations were not. Substantially more
research is required to establish the limits of fix-
ation markers to detect concealed recognition under
intentional countermeasures.
Conclusions
The use of eye tracking for detecting recognition has
clear potential for field use. Markers of recognition for
faces, scenes and objects known in real life uncover
intentional efforts to conceal knowledge. Fixation-based
markers of recognition for personally familiar faces are
particularly robust. Yet detection efficiency for less well
encoded memories varies according to task demands
Millen et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications            (2020) 5:38 Page 15 of 18
such as stimulus class, familiarity and instructions to
conceal. Further research is required to establish the ro-
bustness of different fixation markers during intentional
countermeasures and to determine whether detection of
less familiar faces, places and objects can be improved.
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